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We explore the effect of mobile phone and internet access on levels of collective violent action within 
the Libyan Revolution. Eastern Libya experienced a state-implemented blackout shortly after 
widespread riots and protests began. However, with luck, ingenuity, and foreign aid, Libyan rebels 
forged an independent mobile phone network. We exploit the exogeneity of the timing of the 
network’s reactivation and use a variation of difference-in-differences (DID) to measure the effect on 
the frequency of collective violent action. While the dominant view in the literature is that cell access 
increases violence by lowering the costs of organizing, we find that the reactivation of the mobile 
phone network reduced violent collective action by 21%. We find this negative effect for all conflicts 
and for conflicts that can be identified as initiated by non-state actors. We also study mobile phone’s 
effect on collective deadly action and fatalities using a different source for conflicts, finding similar 
negative effects. We propose mechanisms that may explain the aggregate negative effect: (1) 
substitution of physical protests to digital protests, (3) the reduction of dissatisfaction toward the state, 
and (3) the use of mobile phones to avoid conflict with state actors.   
 
*Corresponding Author. We thank, Robin Grier, Daniel Hicks, Kevin Munger, Jamie Pavlik, Alex 
Salter, Le Wang, and Andrew Young for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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“Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” 
John F. Kennedy 
1. Introduction 
A rough consensus has emerged that horizontal media such as cell phones and the internet are a big 
positive in the operation of markets in the developing world (Jensen (2008), Aker (2010), Muto & 
Yamano (2009)). However, no such consensus exists when it comes to the role of horizontal media 
in the political arena. As we will discuss in depth later, some studies claim that expansion of cell 
coverage increases violent collective action and political unrest, while others find the opposite. The 
debate has become contentious.  Our contributions in this paper are to (1) broaden the theoretical 
perspective on the mechanisms of how horizontal media affect political conflict and (2) present new 
evidence from a case drawn from the Libyan Civil War.   
As we will discuss in our theory section, the main mechanism posited for horizontal media to influence 
political disorder is by lowering the costs for rebels, protesters, and insurgents to organize their efforts 
and thus creates more protests, violence, and deaths. This is undeniable. Yet, we believe there are 
other mechanisms at play that cut in the opposite direction, especially in our case, where Gaddafi 
severed cell communications in East Libya, but rebels, with the help of expat engineers and foreign 
aid, managed to reactivate one of the two downed networks after 31 days of blackout. 
Clearly the state cut cell service to aid their cause in the conflict and hurt the rebels. But the reactivation 
was a surprise to the state, and quasi-random in its exact timing. We exploit the quasi-random elements 
which determined ICT access during and around the reactivation (timing and network selection) to 
gain a cleaner look at the causal effects than has been achieved so far in the literature.   
We believe that there are three overlapping mechanisms that work in the opposite direction of the 
“cell access increases political violence because it lowers the cost of organizing” at play in our case. 
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First, the cessation of cell service makes people angry, and angry people often protest. When the cell 
service resumes, protests by that segment of the population could actually fall. Second, if you were 
already anti-state, it was possible for you to indulge your activism indoors via test messages, tweets, 
Facebook posts, etc. until cell service was cut. At that point, a person would have to take their 
discontent into meat space to express it. Resumption of cell service means that, on the margin, activists 
could re-convert to slacktivism. Third, the resumption of cell service means that prudent protesters 
or rebels could more easily know when and where state forces were located and avoid them if so 
desired. That is to say, cell access can lower the cost of organizing activities in a way that avoids direct 
conflict with state authorities if so desired. In the blackout period, protesters and rebels were “flying 
blind” with respect to the location of state authorities and subject to increased danger. In sum, we 
believe it entirely possible, without denying the truth of the lower organizing costs mechanism that 
the reactivation of cell service in our case at least could reduce physical political unrest and violent 
collective action. 
Indeed, in our statistical analysis, we find that in windows as small as 7 days on either side of the 
reactivation in East Libya, political unrest and violent collective action significantly decreased after the 
reactivation, which we take to mean that the mechanisms we posited above (and discuss further in our 
theory section) outweigh the dominant mechanism in the current literature, at least in this specific 
case.  Our results stand as one significant counterexample to the pessimistic position that access to 
horizontal media raises violent political action in the developing world. 
In Section 2, we begin by telling the story of the East Libyan cell blackout and subsequent partial 
reactivation. Section 3 considers the mechanisms of how horizontal media can affect violent collective 
action in a short theory section. Section 4 describes our data sources and how we constructed a grid 
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level dataset on cell coverage and political unrest in Libya. In Section 5, we cover the details of our 
identification strategy and empirical model and in Section 6 we present our results.   
We initially use a 30-day window on each side of the reactivation and a panel negative binomial 
estimator, and show that the reactivation reduced violent collective action in the affected area. 
Section 7 presents a variety of robustness tests including (a) tightening the window using a grid level 
fixed effects model, (b) a placebo where we falsely assume that the other cell network was the one 
reactivated, (c) a change in the source of the data for our dependent variable, (d) a restriction of the 
sample to just the parts of East Libya that had cell coverage at one point, and finally (e) an alternative 
way to construct standard errors via a permutation test approach. Altogether the results indicate that 
overall violent collective action fell, that rebel and citizen initiated violent collective action fell and that 
fatalities also fell after the surprise reactivation of one cell network in East Libya. Section 8 changes 
the dependent variable to collective violent action and fatalities, where we continue to observe 
substantial negative effects. Section 9 concludes.  
2. Background 
The Libyan Revolution belongs to the broader Arab Spring movement. Aside from regional 
similarities, this series of protests, riots, and rebellions, share another characteristic: the conjectured 
role of mobile phone and internet technologies in both spreading dissent and coordinating collective 
action. Such an argument is defensible, based on the prevalence of Libya’s ICT infrastructure and 
first-hand accounts from dissident organizers. "We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to 
coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world,” tweeted one Arab Spring activist (Howard, 2011).  What’s 
more, Libya’s telecommunication infrastructure is impressive. Figures 1 and 2 show the 2G coverage 
of the Qam and Horrya networks in Libya, the two mobile phone service providers during the 
revolution. As of 2012, there were 9.6 million cellular subscriptions, which comes to 148.19 per 100 
4 
 
inhabitants. 19.9% has internet access (ITU, 2012). Meanwhile, the United States has 317.4 million 
cellular subscriptions, 100 per 100 inhabitants, and 86.8% have access to the internet (The World 
Factbook, 2014). Obviously, telecommunication technologies are pervasive within Libyan society and, 
if they do in fact enable (or discourage) collective violent action, have ample opportunity to do so in 
Libya’s revolution.  
Like many pundits, journalists, and protestors, the potential influence of horizontal media did not 
escape Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s long-reigning military dictator. Shortly after intensifying protests 
in Benghazi launched the revolution (February 15th, 2011), Gaddafi’s forces severed the fiber optics 
cable, which connected the East Libya to the Tripoli-based telecom infrastructure. The blackout 
occurred on approximately March 1st , “somewhere between Misurata and Khomas” (Hill, 2011). Both 
Horrya and Qam no longer functioned east of this interval. Figure 3 depicts the aggregate mobile 
phone coverage prior to the blackout, while Figure 4 approximates the 2G access following Gaddafi’s 
blackout imposed on eastern Libya, based on Hill’s report.  
According to first-hand accounts, this restriction of telecommunications access had a drastic and 
disastrous effect upon rebels and their ability to coordinate military strategy. “’We went to fight with 
flags: Yellow meant retreat, green meant advance,’ said Gen. Ahmed al-Ghatrani, a rebel commander 
in Benghazi. ‘Gadhafi forced us back to the stone age.’” (Coker & Levinson, 2011). This setback stalled 
the rebel military advance. Gadhafi’s forces even began pushing the rebels back towards Benghazi, the 
rebel capital.  
The growing turmoil drew attention from the international community. Among the humanitarians 
seeking to provide aid to the fledgling rebel community, was Ousama Abushagur, a 31-year old Libyan 
telecom executive raised in the US (CL, 2011). Abushagur and his team prepared and delivered the 
first of many aid convoys on Feb. 23rd, 2011, shortly after protests had erupted into outright rebellion. 
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While in eastern Libya, the team discovered the lack of cell and satellite phone service, which inspired 
Abushagur to hatch a plan for the creation of a telecommunication provider entirely independent 
from Gadhafi’s centrally planned mobile phone and internet infrastructure, while exploiting much of 
the existing, but dormant infrastructure.  
Throughout the process of reactivating portions of the Horrya network, Abushagur and his team 
relied on the international community to provide crucial hardware components and services. Some 
countries and organizations balked at the proposal to support a rebellion. Abushagur initially planned 
to acquire hardware from Huawei Technologies, a Chinese telecom company and original contractor 
for the Libyan networks, but the company ultimately refused, choosing to avoid political affiliations 
(CL, 2011).  
Since the rebels saw little chance of convincing other major telecom companies to sell sophisticated 
hardware to a regime, which lacked international recognition, they turned to other Persian Gulf 
nations for assistance. "‘The Emirates government and [its telecommunications company] Etisalat 
helped us by providing the equipment we needed to operate [Horrya] at full capacity,’ said Faisal al-
Safi, a Benghazi official who oversees transportation and communications issues” (CL, 2011). The 
equipment arrived in the U.A.E by March 21st, but still required transport to Benghazi to operate the 
dormant mobile phone network infrastructure in east Libya. To minimize risk of capture or 
destruction of the newly acquired equipment, Abushagur’s team flew the hardware to Egypt, rather 
than directly to Benghazi. Finally, the rebels launched the new Horrya network on April 2nd. Figure 5 
shows the impact of the reactivation. As the reader can see, significant portions of eastern Libya 
regained mobile phone access. However, all areas previously covered by the Qam network remained 
without coverage. The rebels lacked vital hardware to reactivate Qam and the state left the network 
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inactive. A timeline of significant and relevant events of the Libyan Revolution can be found in Figure 
6.  
3. Mechanisms of Horizontal Media’s Effect on Collective Violent Action 
In this section, we discuss the proposed mechanisms linking horizontal media and violence in the 
literature and elaborate on our own ideas. It is both useful and humbling to point out at the outset 
that all of the literature is reduced form and doesn’t explicitly model the causal mechanisms. The 
various papers study the effect that expanding or cutting off or in our case restoring cell phone access 
has on different types of violence. In other words, we are estimating the net effect of all relevant 
mechanisms. In our case, we believe we are isolating the overall causal effect, our identification strategy 
and empirical model (difference-in-differences) is a reduced form approach.  
As noted in the introduction. The most well-known mechanism for why cell access affects violence is 
the argument of PH and Warren that it lowers the cost of organizing violent collective action. We 
agree that this is undeniably true. It is easier to get a group together through SMS than by going door 
to door. Ghodes shows that in the Syrian Civil War, cell blackouts are positively correlated with 
“significantly higher levels state repression”. She argues that the state blocks cell communications as 
a strategy to “target and weaken opposition groups”. In other words, she is implicitly taking the same 
position as PH and Warren. They say access strengthens opposition groups, Ghodes says blackouts 
hurt opposition groups. It is worth pointing out that Ghodes explicitly studies violence by the state. 
She is not directly showing that the opposition was weaker, simply that the blackouts and state 
repression are correlated. PH study the effect of cell phone access on the frequency of organized 
violent events, not distinguishing between state violence and opposition violence. 
SW make the opposite argument. They study the effect of cell phone access on insurgent violence in 
Iraq and find a significant negative correlation. They argue the cell access allows average citizens to 
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report insurgent locations to state authorities, thus limiting insurgents’ abilities to coordinate violent 
action. 
In the Libyan Revolution, some residents of East Libya had cell access, and then it was cut off by 
Gadhafi presumably to aid his efforts to calm the rebellion, just like Ghodes’ case. However, what we 
study is not that blackout, which seems clearly endogenous with planned state violence, but the 
unexpected and randomly timed partial reinstatement of cell service to East Libya. Our cell phone 
access is not expansion of new towers (the location and timing of which could also be endogenous to 
forces that affect violence), but the reactivation of an existing service. As such, we believe there are 
other relevant mechanisms for how cell access would affect violence.  
First, it could deter excesses by state forces as reporting of atrocities or violence against civilians is 
more likely if rebels have cell access. But on the non-state actor side, we also think there are additional 
relevant factors beyond the specified, “easier to organize” mechanism of PH and Warren. For 
example, easier to organize may not automatically lead to greater violence. Citizens could use the 
technology to disseminate information about the location of state actors to avoid violent 
confrontations (kind of a reverse version of the SW argument). In addition, there is a large literature 
claiming that horizontal media keeps people acting in the virtual world instead of in the physical one. 
Regaining cell access could reduce on the street group activities that lead to violence. In our case we 
think this tendency could be amplified by anger against the state for cutting off the service to begin 
with. Think of that as yet another grievance against the state that on the margin would put more 
citizens and angrier citizens out on the street.  The underlying theme of our proposed mechanisms is 
that digital expression is a substitute for physical expression and at the margin, (re)introducing digital 
communication technology can reduce physical expression of political views. 
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Because we are using ACLED data, our events include riots and protests that do not necessarily create 
fatalities and we believe it very reasonable to consider that restored cell access could diminish these 
activities. While our model is at best estimating the causal effect of all mechanisms combined, another 
advantage of the ACLED data is that for a bit over two thirds of the cases, the instigator is identified. 
Given that we estimate models explaining the overall level of conflicts, and additional models 
explaining conflicts initiated by citizens (riots and protests) as well by rebel groups. This is a cleaner 
test of how cell access affects citizen and rebel actions than what PH are able to do with UCDP data 
as it does not identify the initiating party. 
4. Data 
We construct a spatially referenced dataset from a number of sources. For our measure of collective 
violent action, we use the Armed Location and Event Database (ACLED). ACLED is a conflict-level 
dataset that contains descriptors of both conflict time and location, among other covariates. Many of 
the conflicts report the initiating and defending party. From these variables, we identify rebel- and 
citizen-initiated conflicts, which allows us to test hypotheses about the behavior of political dissidents. 
During the 2011 revolution, ACLED reports 674 total conflicts. Of these, we identify 158 that fall 
under the “Riots, Protests, & Rebel-Initiated” subcategory.  
PRIO-Grid is a spatially referenced dataset, which we employ as a framework where other geocoded 
data (i.e. ACLED, 2G data, and blackout areas) can be tied together. Since most of the PRIO-Grid 
data varies at large intervals or is time invariant altogether, we use PRIO-Grid primarily for the spatial 
cell structure. The data uses a global raster of .5 by .5 decimal degree cells. At this spatial level, we plot 
the ACLED data and sum the conflicts which take place in each grid-day observation.  
We use journalistic reports to determine the time and location of the blackout. Al Jazeera (Hill, 2012) 
and Wall Street Journal (Coker & Levinson, 2011) both covered the severance of the fiber optic cable 
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which provided cell phone and internet access to eastern Libya and the ensuing scramble to re-
establish a replacement mobile phone network. Hill (2011) gives a fairly precise account of the 
blackout’s location, “between the cities of Misurata and Khomas”. WSJ reports the rebels placed the 
first call on the network on April 2nd 2011, the date of reactivation. Figure 7 maps the 631 PRIO-Grid 
cells and their categorization into blackout or non-blackout regions, based on the journalistic accounts.  
We acquire individual cellular network coverage maps of both the Horrya and Qam network from 
Collins Bartholomew. Each map displays the precise coverage regions for each, respective network. 
Figures 2 and 3 shows both network coverage areas in Libya. Our data is, to our knowledge, the first 
in the literature to include multiple providers, while maintaining the ability to identify coverage regions 
specific to each provider. To merge the data into the PRIO-Grid framework, we calculate the 
percentage area of Qam and Horrya network coverage for each PRIO-Grid cell. 
There is a total of 632 PRIO-Grid cells within Libya. In the primary specification, we use only 
observations occurring 30 days before and 30 days after the rebel network’s reactivation, as well as the 
day of the reactivation (i.e. 61 days). The final dataset then contains a total of 38,552 cell-day 
observations.  
5. Empirical Strategy  
To identify the causal effect of the 2G mobile phone and internet access, we exploit the sources of 
exogeneity created in the blackout and ensuing scramble to reactivate available infrastructure. We 
observe two periods of rapid change in access to 2G mobile phone and internet infrastructure: the 
initial, region-wide blackout (March 1st), which affects both the Qam and Horrya networks, and the 
reactivation of the Horrya infrastructure (April 2nd). Given the quasi-experiment’s division of Libya 
into treated and control regions, we implement a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy to estimate 
the effect of mobile phone and internet access. Because Libya underwent two different instances of 
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ICT shocks, we are faced with decisions on how to include or manipulate them in our econometric 
framework to best estimate the causal effect of 2G and internet access on collective violent action.  
DID eliminates any time-invariant heterogeneity between the treated (eastern Libya) and control 
(western) regions. Potential confounders that remain must vary across both time and region. Thus, 
our choice of which shock to exploit rests on the context of the shock and how well it satisfies the 
conditions that the DID framework requires. In the initial blackout, state forces select both the timing 
and placement of 2G and internet access. The entirety of eastern Libya (from Khomas, eastward) 
experiences the blackout. Gadhafi and his forces did not select this cutoff at random; certain regions 
were denied access to communication technologies in order to disrupt the organization of protests, 
riots, and rebel activity. Thus, during the initial blackout period, the determinants of horizontal ICT 
access are network coverage infrastructure (endogenously selected at installation) and state-selected 
blackout regions (endogenous). The blackout also begins at a time selected by the state (endogenous). 
Our primary concern is that state forces severed access in anticipation of increasing violence in eastern 
Libya, a time- and region-varying determinant of anti-state collective action.  
Once the blackout began, rebel forces recognized immediately the crucial role of mobile phone access 
in organization. If possible, the rebels would have reactivated both networks immediately. The 
constraints which delayed this process represent the determinants of the timing of the access, which, if 
exogenous, mean that the DID framework can identify the causal effect of horizontal ICT access. 
Treated and control groups may remain non-randomly sorted; their time-invariant differences 
accounted for through the model.  From the Coker & Levinson (2011), we know that the rebels 
encountered many delays (bureaucratic, technical, financial, customs, etc.) in the creation of the 
independent network, but there is little evidence to suggest that these determinants are correlated with 
political disruption in the region. Instead, the eventual reactivation rested on forgotten, abandoned 
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hardware and the willingness (or unwillingness) of outside, foreign parties to offer technical or 
financial assistance to the rebel government. Given this evidence, we argue that the reactivation 
occurred exogenously to other determinants of conflict and so choose to focus our analysis around 
this event.  
It is also important to note that the rebels were only able to reactivate one of the two known mobile 
coverage providers. So, even within the blackout region, the fraction of each cell with access to any 
2G or internet coverage changes. Regions that had access to the Qam network, but not the Horrya, 
would not see mobile phone access until after the revolution’s end. We further exploit this random 
variation in access by including time-invariant indicators for both networks. The specification is a 
variation of the difference-in-differences framework:  
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺ2ܩሻ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶሺܤܴሻ௜ ൅ ߚଷሺܴܲሻ௧ ൅ ߚସሺܪ݋ݎݎݕܽሻ௜ ൅ ߚହሺܳܽ݉ሻ௜ ൅ ߚ଺ሺܰܣܱܶሻ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧ 
The violence in cell ݅ at time ݐ is a function of the 2G variable, which corresponds to the interaction 
term in a standard DID model; it represents the percentage of the 2G coverage in the eastern Libya, 
within the Horrya region following the reactivation. In this way, the model departs from a traditional 
DID in which the interaction term is binary. ሺܰܣܱܶሻ௧ is an indicator for the period in which NATO 
intervened during the revolution. Indicators are also included for the blackout region and reactivation 
period, ሺܤܴሻ௜ and ሺܴܲሻ௧, respectively. Unlike a simple DID, we also include indicators for mobile 
phone access: ሺܪ݋ݎݎݕܽሻ௜ describes the fraction of each cell that lies within the Horrya coverage 
region. The same is true for the ሺܳܽ݉ሻ௜ variable. The addition of these predictors slightly complicates 
the identification strategy compared to a standard DID model, so we explain how our model identifies 
the effect of mobile phone access and draw a parallel to the simple DID specification below.  
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(ߚଵ) is the coefficient of interest in our model. If the specification excluded (ߚଵ), the model would still 
predict outcomes for all combinations of network access (i.e. Horrya or Qam), region (east or west), 
and time (pre- or post-reactivation) dummies (hereafter, “NRT combinations”). The addition of (ߚଵ) 
captures how these predictions shift when the eastern Horrya region regained mobile phone access.1  
Although more complex through the addition of a dimension in the data (i.e. Horrya and Qam 
variables) the underlying identification in our model mimics that from the simple DID specification.  
What’s more, the complexity limits the number of potential confounders. Any heterogeneity that 
might otherwise explain the coefficient of interest, must vary (simultaneously) at the network-, region-
, and time-level, as the telecommunication access does.  
To exploit the exogeneity observed in the latter ICT shock, our primary specification restricts the data 
to observations that occur within a 30-day window on either side of the reactivation. We face a tradeoff 
in the selection of the time window. Expanding the bandwidth increases the number of available 
observations, but increases the potential for network-, region-, or time-varying confounders to 
contaminate estimates of the treatment effect. Given the count nature of the data, we use a negative 
binomial model and estimate the parameters through iterative maximum likelihood.2  However, we 
include OLS estimates of a fixed effects model in Section 7. In the OLS models, we also vary the data 
specification, by reducing the “x-day window” around the reactivation to test whether the results are 
driven primarily by the data’s proximity to the original, endogenous shock to ICT access.   
6. Results  
                                                 
1 In the appendix, we change the value of this variable, allowing it to take a positive value in all NRT combinations that 
have mobile phone access. We count 5 such NRT combinations: Qam-West-Pre, Qam-West-Post, Horrya-West-Pre, 
Horrya-West-Post, & Horrya-East-Post. This allows all relevant NRT combinations to contribute toward the estimation 
of the coefficient of interest. Results remain unchanged and statistically significant.  
2 The data overwhelmingly reject a constant dispersion parameter so we model dispersion via random effects in the 
negative binomial modelling. 
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Table 1 presents the results for the primary specification, which restricts the cell-day observations to 
only those within a 30-day window on either side of the Horrya network’s reactivation. Columns (1) 
and (2) list coefficients for identical models but use both dependent variables: ACLED Conflicts and 
Riots, Protests, & Rebel-Initiated events respectively. In column (1), we observe the coefficient of 
interest to be both negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. These findings suggest that the 
reactivation of the horizontal ICT infrastructure decreased levels of violence.  
Coefficients in the negative binomial model (which are provided in Table 1) show the difference in 
the log of expected counts when there is a one unit increase in x. This particular interpretation can be 
unintuitive, so we instead discuss results using the incidence rate ratios (IRR), which are the original 
coefficients, but exponentiated. The IRR coefficients represent the factor by which the rate of the y-
variable is multiplied given a one-unit increase in x. For column (1), the IRR coefficient is 0.364. 
However, our 2G variable is not simply binary, but represents the fraction of the cell’s area with mobile 
phone coverage. Among the 116 affected cells (i.e. those with non-zero Horrya coverage in eastern 
Libya), the average level of exposure to the Horrya network is approximately 33%. Taking this partial 
coverage into account, our model predicts the Horrya network’s reactivation to have reduced conflicts 
by 21% on average within the affected regions.3  
We are particularly concerned with the response of civilians and rebels to changes in mobile phone 
and internet access, as this allows us to check for evidence of a substitution effect. For this reason, we 
systematically categorize ACLED events as either riots, protests, or rebel-initiated conflicts and 
estimate the effects of the reactivation on these two dependent variables. Column (2) gives the 
estimates of the model coefficients for “Riots, Protests, and Rebel-Initiated” events. We observe a 
                                                 
3 An IRR coefficient of 0.364 corresponds to an approximately 64% decrease in the rate of the dependent variable given 
a one-unit change in x (i.e. conflict rate is .364 of original predicted rate). We multiply by the average exposure to the 
Horrya treatment (.33) to obtain the average treatment effect. 
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larger and statistically significant (i.e. at the 5% level), effect in this data specification. Using the IRR 
interpretation, the model estimates that the reactivation reduced the rate of conflicts by around 30%.  
The estimates suggest that the rate of conflict falls significantly when a region has access (or in this 
case, regains access) to mobile phone and internet networks compared to regions with previous access 
where there was no re-activation. The biggest effect is on rebel-initiated events which we categorized 
as protest, riots, or fighting started by a rebel military group. This finding is consistent with the 
substitution channel we propose outweighing the lowering cost of coordination channel most 
discussed in the literature. The channels of horizontal media that reduce collective action, in this 
context, outweigh the positive effect of coordination cost reduction. Given this statements holds when 
the data is parsed down to only protestor- and rebel-initiated actions, we interpret this to strongly 
evidence the channels we propose in Section 3. After the treatment, the cost to organizing collective 
violent action has been theoretically reduced, but the likelihood of rebel-initiated conflict falls 
significantly.  
7. Robustness 
7.1. Restricting the Window 
The validity of the identification strategy rests on the exogenous nature of the reactivation’s timing. 
As the data strays further from this point, more doubt is cast on the causality of the findings. The 
nearness of the initial blackout (March 1st) to the reactivation (April 2nd) exacerbates this concern in 
our quasi-experiment. We address this issue by restricting the window closer around the reactivation. 
Note this procedure introduces some tradeoffs. Similar to a regression discontinuity design, a tighter 
bandwidth reduces potential bias, but reduces the number of observation with which to estimate the 
parameters of the model, thus increasing the estimated coefficient’s standard error. Reducing the time 
dimension in the negative binomial model is particularly troublesome as it increases the likelihood of 
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convergence errors during the estimation process. To address these two problems, we (1) use a variety 
of bandwidths and (2) replace the negative binomial model with OLS.4 In the OLS estimates, we 
include fixed effects at the PRIO-Grid cell level. The empirical specification remains otherwise 
unchanged from Section 5.  
Table 2 presents the results of the robustness test. We select three, increasingly restrictive, bandwidths. 
Column (1) uses the same data specification (i.e. 30 day pre- & post-reactivation bandwidth) as the 
primary analysis, demonstrating that the estimates remain statistically significant, even in a fixed effect, 
linear model. Column (2) restricts the data further, to a 15-day bandwidth. Despite the growing 
standard errors, both dependent variables remain statistically significant. We find the coefficient on 
the “Riots, Protests, & Rebel-Initiated” increases substantially in the data specification. This 
phenomenon continues in column (3), where, after restricting the data to a 7-day bandwidth, “Riots, 
Protests, & Rebel-Initiated” estimate grows from -.0216 to -.0371. “ACLED Conflicts” is essentially 
unchanged and both increase in statistical significance to the 5% level. From this test, we conclude 
that the Section 6 findings are unlikely to be driven by the data’s proximity to the original, endogenous 
blackout or other, unobservable confounders. Instead, we find statistically and economically 
significant effects, as the data draws tighter around the unanticipated mobile phone reactivation.  
7.2 Placebo Test by Falsely Reactivating “Qam” Network 
In this robustness test, we code a false reactivation of the Qam network, Libya’s primary, state-
controlled mobile phone provider. Like the Horrya network, Gadhafi’s forces deactivated Qam’s 
infrastructure east of the region between Misurata and Khomas. However, unlike Horrya, the rebels 
were unable to reactivate any of the Qam infrastructure.  
                                                 
4 We were unable to get negative binomial models to converge in these shorter samples. 
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We manipulate the data to create a false reactivation of the Qam network in rebel-controlled, eastern 
Libya. The placebo takes place at the same time as the true establishment of the Horrya network, April 
2nd. We also repeat the methodology used in Section 5; the data specification, empirical specification, 
negative binomial model, and maximum likelihood estimation technique remain unchanged. If the 
tests return statistically significant or coefficients of comparable magnitude, it might indicate that there 
exist some unobserved, time-varying determinants of collective violent action between regions with 
mobile phone access and those without. However, if the treatment coefficient is attenuated and 
insignificant, the test evidences the causality of the true, network-specific reactivation effect.  
The results for this placebo test can be found in Table 3, where the placebo treatment coefficient is 
statistically insignificant for both dependent variables. "ACLED Conflicts” and “Riots, Protests, & 
Rebel-Initiated” are approximately half as large as their “true treatment” counterparts. Both the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficients witness substantial decreases relative to the results from 
the true, Horrya reactivation. The Qam network covers much of the Horrya network, so we expect 
the coefficients to resemble one another. Despite this correlation, the Qam placebo is far from 
statistically significant, indicating the only Horrya network witnesses reduced violence after the 
reactivation.  
7.3 Standard Difference-in-Differences for Connected East Libya 
In the primary specification, the coefficient of interest measures the deviation between a prediction 
for the treated NRT combination (i.e. generated by the estimated coefficients from Horrya, East, & 
Post-Reactivation) and the actual, observed counts. Each element in the specification (i.e. NRT) 
contributes to the estimate of the treatment coefficient. In this robustness test, we limit the data to 
eastern Libya cells with non-zero mobile phone coverage. Using this data, we perform a standard DID 
between the Qam and Horrya cells. Although this reduces the number of observations, the 
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specification strictly measures how differences in collective action between east Libyan Qam cells and 
east Libyan Horrya cells changes across the exogenous network reactivation. The former is an 
appropriate counterfactual for the latter, as both groups were selected for the original 2G network 
access and into the blackout. Data from cells that lack 2G access or from western Libya are omitted 
and therefore play no role in the estimation of the treatment group’s predicted outcome. Ultimately, 
this robustness exercise tests whether the inclusion of more dissimilar regions (i.e. non-2G, western 
Libya) in our empirical methodology drives the estimated treatment effect.  
The specification is:  
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵሺ2ܩሻ௜௧ ൅ ൅ߚଶሺܴܲሻ௧ ൅ ߚଷሺܪ݋ݎݎݕܽሻ௜ ൅ ߚସሺܳܽ݉ሻ௜ ൅ ߚହሺܰܣܱܶሻ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧ 
The first three parameters of the model (ߚଵ, ߚଶ, and ߚଷ) are the standard parameters in a DID 
specification. We continue to control for the time-invariant level of Qam coverage and the NATO 
no-fly period. Similar to the primary empirical test, we estimate the parameters of this specification 
in a negative binomial model, using iterative maximum likelihood. Table 4 contains the estimated 
parameters for models of both dependent variables. We observe increases in the both estimated 
treatment coefficient, relative to the results in Section 6. ACLED conflicts (1) grows from -1.010 
to -1.365, and riots, protests, & rebel-initiated conflicts (2) increases in magnitude from -2.550 to 
-2.941. When measuring the effect of telecommunication access on all ACLED conflicts, we also 
find the coefficient to be statistically significant at the 1% level.  
7.4 Alternative Estimator of Standard Errors 
Calculating valid standard errors in DID models is challenging. We use a generalized DID and a 
negative binomial estimator, but our results do not escape the challenge.5 In order to address this issue, 
                                                 
5 Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan (2004) were among the first to point out this issue. 
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some researchers have turned to constructing a distribution of the model’s treatment effect through a 
variant of Fisher’s (1935) randomization test, on uncontaminated data.6 In this subsection, we use data 
from the Libyan Civil War as the setting for our randomization test. 
We repeat the model and estimation procedure described in Section 5 on a series of “placebo” 
interventions which are placed at every possible day within the civil war. Because the original data 
specification uses the 30-day window format, we exclude the first and last 30 days of the civil war, as 
they are unable to match the original data specification. There are a total of 1,266 “placebo” 
interventions which fit these criteria.7 After the coefficients are estimated and stored, we append the 
true estimated coefficient from Section 6. We then replace all coefficients with their absolute value 
and sort them by magnitude. The p-value is the number of placebos with a larger magnitude divided 
by the total number of placebos.  
Figure 4 contains four panels that describe the distributions of the randomization coefficients. Panels 
A and C plot the absolute values of the “ACLED Conflicts” and “Riots, Protests, & Rebel-Initiated” 
coefficients. A red, dashed and dotted line indicates the location of the true treatment effect estimate 
from Section 6. These two panels visualize the p-value calculation process of our randomization test. 
Panels B and D show the behavior of the placebo coefficients as the placebo date varies over the 
course of the Libyan Civil War. Here, the raw coefficient is used, not the absolute value. 
Using the new distribution and standard error estimates, we calculate the effect of mobile phone access 
on “ACLED Conflicts” to have a p-value of .095, while the treatment effect on “Riots, Protests, & 
Rebel-Initiated” has a p-value of .045. From this exercise, we conclude that the significance of our 
                                                 
6 See for example, Buchmueller et al. (2011), and Bunnenberg & Meyer (2017). 
7 There are 595 days of Libyan Civil War data in ACLED. However, to properly mimic the specification of the primary 
analysis, where 61-days around the reactivation window are used, we omit false reactivations that do not have 30 days of 
data preceding or following that date.  
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primary estimates are likely not driven by overly-conservative estimates of the coefficient of interest’s 
standard error.  
8. Collective Deadly Action  
In contrast to much of the established literature, our analysis uses data on collective action, both deadly 
and non-deadly.8 We chose to study the impact of ICT on all collective action, because non-deadly 
political dissent can meaningfully impact political and economic outcomes. However, the question 
remains whether mobile phone and internet access affects actions that incur fatalities differently than 
all actions. In this section, we use data on collective deadly violent action from the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP) and measure the causal effect of the mobile phone reactivation on this 
dependent variable.  
We also study the reactivation’s effect on fatalities, an outcome which has, to our knowledge, gone 
un-studied in the literature. Doing so could reveal additional insight into the mechanism of the effect. 
For example, it is possible that when the rebels reactivate the mobile phone network they organize 
more effective (or larger) events of collective violent action. The count of conflicts may fall while 
fatalities increase, in which case concluding that mobile phones mitigate violence would be, at best, a 
half-truth. This section tests for evidence of that possibility.  
We employ the same empirical methodology (i.e. generalized DID specification in a negative binomial 
model) used in Section 6, but the dependent variables are UCDP conflicts and UCDP total fatalities. 
The results of this estimation procedure are found in Table 5. In column (1) presents estimates of the 
treatment coefficient that are slightly larger (-1.511) in magnitude and comparable in significance to 
those from the primarily analysis, found in Table 1. To interpret and compare, we find the mobile 
                                                 
8 UCDP, the data most often used in the “mobile phones and collective violent action” literature, requires a conflict result 
in at least 25 deaths to appear in the data. ACLED does not share this requirement. 
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phone reactivation reduced ACLED conflicts by 21% and UCDP conflicts by 26%.9 Similarly, column 
(2) lists the coefficient estimates for the model of total fatalities. The reactivation’s effect is significant 
at the .05 level and is estimated to have reduced fatalities by approximately 30%.  
These findings suggest that the negative effect of ICT access on collective action extends to deadly 
action as well. We also reject the hypothesis that the decreasing number of ACLED and UCDP 
conflicts is driven by changing “size” of conflicts; there is no evidence that the conflicts become more 
deadly. In fact, our model estimates a negative treatment effect on total fatalities as well.  
9. Conclusion  
In this paper, we exploit a plausibly exogenous reactivation of a previously deactivated Libyan mobile 
phone network. We find that mobile phone access significantly reduced levels of collective violent 
action within the Libyan Revolution. When categorized data into “Riots, Protests, & Rebel-Initiated” 
conflicts, the strong, negative relationship between horizontal media and this type of political disorder 
endures. We also conduct a series of robustness tests, including (1) a restriction of bandwidth around 
the reactivation used to estimate the treatment effect, (2) a placebo test, in which we falsely reactivate 
the Qam region, (3) a more traditional DID model using only East Libya regions, and (4) use a variant 
of the randomization test to construct a more-accurate measure of the DID standard errors; the tests 
produce no outcomes that jeopardize the results of the original empirical strategy. We also study the 
impact of the mobile phone and internet reactivation on the count of collective violent action and 
fatalities. Estimates of the treatment coefficient in both models are statistically and politically 
significant, suggesting that the “size” of conflicts are not increasing while their total count decrease.  
                                                 
9 An IRR coefficient of 0.221 corresponds to an approximately 78% decrease in the rate of the dependent variable given 
a one-unit change in x (i.e. conflict rate is .221 of original predicted rate). We multiply by the average exposure to the 
Horrya treatment (.33) to obtain the average treatment effect. 
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This article demonstrates that, within an ongoing conflict, access to horizontal media may play a more 
complex role than originally thought. Although undeniably crucial in the convenient organization of 
collective action, horizontal media may also (1) serve as a means for protestors and rioters to avoid 
conflict with the state, (2) distract political dissidents from contributing more actively in physical 
protests or rebel activity, and/or (3) reduce dissatisfaction with the regime. In this setting, we find the 
latter channels stronger than the former.  
The quasi-experimental setting limits the external validity of our findings. Through it, we better 
understand the causal effect of ICT on collective violent action within an ongoing conflict, but not 
how horizontal media shapes attitudes towards regimes prior to conflict. Future work should attempt 
to identify the causal effect of ICT on collective violent action in this context, though exogenous 
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